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Abstract: This paper examines the effects of transfer- pricing regulation and compliance on tax 
administration in Nigeria. The paper uses a descriptive survey research design. Questionnaire was used 
as the research instrument for data collection. Analyses were made with ordered logit regression, 
Pearson product moment correlation, variance inflation factor (VIF) and white heteroskedasticity test. 
Ordered logit regression reveals that transfer- pricing regulation had a tendency to significantly 
influence tax administration with z-values of 2.8931 (p=0.00381) while transfer- pricing compliance 
had an insignificant effect of 0.016 with z-values of 0.1335 (p=0.89379) on tax administration in 
Nigeria at likelihood ratio test of Chi-square (2)= 25.7916 [0.0000]. This study implies that transfer- 
pricing and its compliance has the capacity to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of tax 
administration in Nigeria. Hence, we concluded that there is poor administration of transfer- pricing tax 
policy in Nigeria. It is, therefore, recommended that Federal Inland Revenue Service should put in place 
not only transfer- pricing laws but adequate machinery in terms of human and technological capital 
coupled with sensitization on the applicability of the existing transfer- pricing tax policy in Nigeria.  
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1. Background 
Soyode & Kajola (2006) defined tax as an obligatory exaction of money by a civic 
authority for public determinations and prosperity. Taxation is machinery as well as 
a process in which society, communities, and group of individuals contribute an 
agreed sum of money which is crucial to the resolution, development, and 
administration of the public. Lambo (2005) defined transfer tax as a tax on the 
passing of title property from one person to another. Transfer tax comes from 
transaction fee charged on the transfer of properties from one person to the other. 
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Essentially, this type of tax is considered in the presence of legal registration of 
transfer, which could be in form of real estate, bond, ordinary share e.t.c. Notably, 
transfer tax in some respect needs notary confirmation, which might add up to the 
cost of transaction. As conceptualized in the United State of America, transfer tax is 
an estate tax and/or gift tax. This type of tax stems from the transfer of property due 
to death, but not tax placed on the property itself. Generally, taxpayer claims that 
transfer tax is an unconstitutional tax, since it’s a direct tax that is not apportioned 
among the states in the proportion of the population distribution. In a broad sense, 
estate tax, gift tax, capital gains tax, sales tax on goods (not services), and certain 
use of taxes are all transfer taxes because they involve a tax on the transfer of title 
(Dubin, 2004). 
Lambo & Obaji (2005) posited that expectation of taxpayers to enjoy social facilities 
such as educational system; health care system and transportation network are 
nothing to write home about, owing to the instability of the tax system. As reported 
by World Bank (2011), Nigeria ranked low in the rating of tax payment and 
compliance among all countries of the world. Specifically, it was reported that 
Nigerian ranked 109 out 183 countries of the world, and 27 of 46 Sub-Saharan 
African countries. Recently, Nigeria government has made some improvements on 
the tax system in respect to the tax compliance needs of the country by establishing 
Federal Board of Inland Revenue to function as the operational arm of the Federal 
Inland Revenue Services. The commission was responsible for effective tax 
administration, accounting, and reporting. In the same vein, government 
innovatively put up tax identification number programme in an attempt to occasion 
reliable tax base for tax administration in the country, as well as to link tax 
stakeholder together. Also, there is Joint Tax Board (JTB), amongst others, which 
are constituted to address problems of tax policies and its implementations; tax 
collection and compliance of taxpayers’ compliance, given the fact that people are 
an integral part of the tax system.  
Transfer tax has implication on the level of taxpayer’s willingness, and as such, it 
influences tax revenue generation. Notably, it leads to government’s inability to 
allocate national resource generated from taxation and other sources of revenue 
towards growth and development objectives. From observation, the level of 
taxpayer’s unwillingness is higher in the informal sector due to limited government 
monitoring. Willingness to pay tax in developing countries is umpteen driven by the 
perception of how government engages resources raised from tax payment. The 
observation in developing countries is that revenue generation from taxation is 
relatively low, and this had limited the level of project development which could 
trickle down to an average person. OECD (2012) reveals that there is need for a new 
two-tiered approach to transfer pricing documentation based on the Master file and 
the Local file. The final draft is planned to be completed in June 2014 and likely to 
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come up with a new chapter of transfer pricing guidelines which is to have a notable 
influence on documentation rule of transfer pricing of tax authorities. 
The following three research questions are formulated to guide the study: 
i. To what extent can transfer- pricing regulation and compliance improve tax system 
in Nigeria? 
ii. In what ways can Nigeria improve her tax system in order to increase the level of 
transfer- pricing regulation and compliance? 
iii. To what extent does transfer- pricing regulation and compliance contribute to the 
tax administration in Nigeria? 
This study will therefore consider the effect of transfer pricing regulation and 
compliance on tax administration in Nigeria.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1.1. Concept of Transfer- Pricing 
Mckinley (2003) explained transfer price as the price charged between related parties 
in an intercompany transaction, such entities are not consolidated and their 
transactions are therefore not eliminated. A firm’s transfer- pricing framework has 
notable effect on an average performance, especially when measured in terms of 
profit after tax, as pointed out by Garrison (2008), transfer price in the context of a 
firm is the price charged for transaction between divisions of an organization, either 
in terms of provision of goods or rendering of services. Transfer- pricing refers to 
the value at which one entity in a group of entities sells goods, services or intellectual 
property to another entity within the same entity. Needham (2013) observed that the 
tax reduction methods used by multinational companies have been well known for 
decades. These tax reduction methods include among other things, transfer- pricing 
and transaction completion in lower-tax countries.  
Allain (2010) suggested that transfer- pricing adjustment between associated 
enterprises will trigger Value added tax effects. An increase or a decrease in the 
transfer price of a supply would obviously result in an additional consideration or a 
credit that should reflect the applied Value added tax consideration. Transfer- pricing 
fundamentally relates the objectives of the domestic tax authorities with that of the 
foreign tax authorities and taxpayers. It is an essential instrument used for ensuring 
integrated action in an organization as well as action differentiation in a bit to ensure 
performance evaluation.  
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2.1.2. Overview of Nigeria Tax System  
Different tax policies, tax laws and administration framework characterized the 
Nigeria Tax System. These, coupled with policies and laws, are expected to work in 
agreement with one another in order to achieve the overall objectives for economic 
growth of the nation. However, with reference to the presidential committee set up 
on National tax policy in 2008, the overall focus and primary objectives of Nigeria 
tax system is to provide and contribute to the social and economic well- being of 
citizens, and this can be done either directly by improving existing and formulating 
new tax policies or indirectly by making optimum utilization of tax generated from 
revenue for the benefit and development of the citizens. To achieve these objectives 
through the generated revenue, the tax system was expected to minimize the 
economy distortion in Nigeria. Other expectations of the tax system of Nigeria in 
line with the presidential committee on National Tax Policy (2008) were as follows: 
to pursue equity distribution and fairness in the country; to provide economic growth 
and even development; to provide economic stabilization to the public; to correct 
market failure and other imperfections thereof; and to generate stable revenue and 
other resources required by government to accomplish public project and make 
beneficent investment for the public. 
In an attempt to achieve maximum expectation, the system is assumed to be in 
compliance with the taxation principles, which are serving as a lubricant to the real 
effective tax system. Nigerian tax system has been surrounded by a multiplicity of 
tax collecting bodies at the three levels of government which are federal, state and 
local governments. The main problem associated with tax system in Nigeria is the 
little precision about the jurisdiction capabilities with a doubt on the country’s 
observance of the fiscal federalism system of government (Ahunwan, 2009). 
The following are some of the frequent resolutions proposed toward improving the 
tax system in the country; minimizing of tax evasion to the lowest level; uniform, 
fair and unbiased administration of related tax laws; promote voluntary compliance 
through effective tax system and; impacting public assurance in the truthfulness of 
tax system. Even at that, many Nigerians as corporate entities do not value and 
respect the tax system of the country due to government’s failure to provide 
fundamental facilities as a result of ineffective tax system. In order to reinforce the 
country’s tax system therefore, Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), t must 
consider these strategic areas, namely; enforcement activities of tax laws and tax 
compliance; staff development and capacity-building; improved tax collection 
indicators and parameters andestablishing measures to limit bribery and corruption 
among tax officials.  
In Nigeria, some of the tax collectors are often pupations for corruption. To solve 
this problem, there is a need to establish computerized systems and boost tax 
authorities by rewarding honesty and transparency. Also, the public should be 
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encouraged to report dishonest tax collectors to their supervisors or prosecuting 
attorney for punishment and prosecution while the higher management of tax 
assistance in the country would engage in constant reviews and performance 
appraisal of field staff/officers (Ahunwan, 2009). The country tax system is 
associated with some inherent problems such as inadequate accessible information 
to taxpayers; lack of tax revenue accountability on its expenditure; problems of 
multiple taxation at all levels of government, lack of transparency on taxation powers 
at all level of government encroachment; applying of aggressive and unconventional 
methods for tax collection; lack of trained manpower and insufficient funding, 
increased demand by the government to generate more revenue internally; inefficient 
funds collection and refund system; outdated tax laws and non-review of tax 
legislation to t represent the country’s current tax realities; lack of unambiguous 
directional policy for tax matters and the absence of laid down practical guidelines 
for the process of the various tax authorities. These and some other problems are the 
most common issues which have not been sufficiently handled for many years in 
Nigeria’s tax system. The major possible reason for this is substantial reliance on oil 
revenues and none- attention to tax-related sources of revenue. In recent times, the 
federal government is driving towards diversifying the economy to non-oil based 
economy due to global challenges in oil market by considering more non-oil tax 
revenue for building sustainable and stable sources of revenue to shoulder capital 
project.  
2.1.2. Theoretical Consideration of Compliance 
Tax is a crucial player in every society; the tax system is an opportunity for the 
government to collect additional revenue for funding developmental projects in the 
society. Taxation is one of the most relatively effective resource mobilizations means 
in a country towards the promotion of economic growth and development. Tax has 
been conceptualized as a compulsory level imposed by the government on an 
individual, an entity’s income and/or property, in the quest to raise funds to finance 
the provision of security, infrastructural facilities that can ensure lasting conducive 
living condition for the citizenry (Appah & Oyandonghan, 2011). This compulsory 
levy is often imposed by the government for other reasons including regulation of 
the production supply and distribution of certain goods and/or services. According 
to Appah (2010), there are four key issues surrounding taxation, especially in 
understanding the role it plays in the growth and development process of an 
economy. Firstly, it’s a mandatory citizenry contribution to the society. Secondly, it 
places uniforms obligation on payers, thirdly, benefits received is not equivalent to 
tax paid, and finally, tax imposition is not because the government has done anything 
substantial to the payers. Hence these observations reflect that maintaining good tax 
structure is sine-qua-non to maintaining sustainable economic growth and 
development.  
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According to Torgler (2011), the interest of researchers over the years towards the 
evaluation of the level of tax compliance as well as tax evasion has been on the 
increase both in developed and developing countries of the world. In addition to 
several aspects of tax that had been research overtime is the area moral fundamental 
of taxation in the country. This relates to the rationing of the reason why people pay 
tax, which also extends to the basic model of tax compliance choices. Many of these 
aspects can be discussed under the general rubric of behavioral economics, broadly 
described as a tool that uses methods and evidence from other social sciences to relay 
the basis behind the decision of an individual person or a group of persons. 
In a multinational environment, the transfer- pricing policy contributes to a large 
variety of goals, including profit maximization, cash flow, sales and marketing 
optimization, taxes, and tariffs minimization and other socio-political objectives 
such as favourable financial relationship with the host country and currency stability. 
Quite a number of studies had been geared towards ascertaining the optimal transfer- 
pricing policies adopted among multinational firms. Most of these studies assumed 
that MNEs is to use one set of transfer- pricing books (Smith, 2002). They derive the 
optimal transfer price for each intra-firm dealings as well as tax compliances and 
performance goal evaluation. In contrast, a limited number of recent studies provided 
two models that distinct transfer price, one to serve as evaluation purposes and the 
other to serve tax purposes (Hyde & Choe, 2005). 
2.1.4. Empirical Evidence 
Dyreng (2008) carried out research on firms’ ability to avoid taxes over a long period 
of time using a dataset of 2077 U.S. firms from 1995 to 2004. The researcher 
revealed a significant fraction of firms that could avoid corporate taxes for the 10-
year period. This explained a long-term tax avoidance which might be triggered by 
management actions. Firms may be involved in tax planning for a long period but 
may be limited if the motivation for such activities is based on tax law ambiguities.  
Sikka (2010) affirmed that engaging transfer- pricing towards reducing tax 
avoidance and evasion is open to regulatory authorities more than the public because 
detecting tax avoidance and evasion using other means is more difficult and less 
economical for regulatory authorities to detect and this makes it a complex game that 
involves numerous bodies – corporations, accountants, lawyers, consultants, 
governments, tax authorities, multinational agencies, NGOs and others engaged in 
establishing and revising the rules of the game with regard to which method(s) of 
calculating prices is acceptable.  
International Monetary Fund (IMF) states that multi-global trade has created 
problems for national tax authorities from the potential use and abuse of transfer- 
pricing by multinational organizations. According to Tanzi (2000), there is a belief 
that some enterprises are in the practice of manipulating prices in the bit to retract 
profits from areas of high tax to areas of low rates. Trans- pricing rules and the arm’s 
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length model were first introduced in Russia in 1999. Some of the issues have been 
given visibility by the trade in oil and gas as major contributors to the Russian 
economy. In early 2004, a World Bank report stated that the country’s oil and gas 
exports accounted for 25% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rather 
than 9% reported in the official data. According to Ahrend (2004) reasons for 
discrepancy in transfer- pricing include among other things the fact that corporations 
objectively harness the loopholes in the tax system.  
Mutua (2012) examined transfer- pricing management strategies by MNEs and 
concluded that there is an increased level of tax compliance enforcement, where 
Nigeria would be forced to conduct TP audits and assessments on MNEs that fail to 
comply with the rules. He observed that Nigeria has not imposed penalties to 
companies without TP policies and recommended that there is a need for MNE to 
understand what TP means and that enlightenment should be carried out on the 
effects of the levels of inter-company transactions with related companies. He also 
recommended that there is a need to establish how performance management is 
measured in MNEs, whether it depends on the levels of sales or otherwise. From 
PWC (2013) report, it was indicated that Nigeria is currently requesting transfer- 
pricing documentation from all taxpayers with cross-border-related- party 
transactions with the intention of risk profiling them for the purpose of conducting 
transfer- pricing audits. They recommended that multinationals should take transfer- 
pricing seriously, develop and properly maintain properly documented and 
defensible transfer- pricing policies. Nigeria Government may be losing billions of 
shillings through well-connected dodgy tax deals involving multinational 
corporations. Through transfer- pricing, the foreign firms avoid taxes, denying the 
country the much-needed revenues for development. Therefore, it is very paramount 
to investigate the effect of transfer- pricing regulation and compliance on the tax 
Administration in Nigeria. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Research Design and Data Source 
The research design adopted in the study is descriptive survey, while questionnaire 
was subjected to content validity, test and test-retest reliability test was administered 
to a total of one hundred and twenty (120) staffers of Federal Inland Revenue Service 
in South-West, Nigeria.  
3.2. Model Specification 
The model stated below was based on the functional relationship between transfer- 
pricing regulation, compliance and tax administration. 
TAXAD= β + a1 TPR + a2 TPC+µ 
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Where: 
TAXAD= Tax Administration, TPR= Transfer Pricing Regulation, TPC=Transfer 
Pricing Compliance 
3.3. Estimating Technique 
Specifically, data collected from the research instrument was analyzed using ordered 
logit regression and correlation analysis followed by post-estimation test such as 
Variance inflation factor (VIF) and White Heteroskedasticity test.  
Table 1. Measurement of Variables and Expected Associations with Tax 
Administration 
Variables Symbols Unitof Measurement Expected Signs  
(Apriori Expectation) 
Dependent Variable    
Tax Administration TAXAD (1-5Likert Scale) Ordinal  
Independent 
Variables 
   
Transfer Pricing 
Regulation 
TPR (1-5Likert Scale) Ordinal + (high transfer pricing 
regulation, high tax 
administration) 
Transfer Pricing 
Compliance 
TPC (1-5Likert Scale) Ordinal + (high transfer pricing 
compliance, high tax 
administration) 
Source: Authors’ Design, 2017 
 
4. Model Estimation and Interpretation of Findings 
This section shows the correlation of the characteristics of the variables ranging from 
Pearson correlation matrix, orderd logit regression, variance inflation factor (VIF) 
and White Heteroskedasticity test. 
Table 2. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Correlations 
 Tax 
Administration 
Transfer Pricing 
Regulation 
Transfer Pricing 
Compliance 
Tax 
Administration 
Pearson Correlation 1 .273** .075 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .003 .432 
N 113 113 113 
TransferPricing 
Regulation 
Pearson Correlation .273** 1 .272** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003  .004 
N 113 113 113 
Transfer 
Pricing 
Compliance 
Pearson Correlation .075 .272** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .432 .004  
N 113 113 113 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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The results as presented in table 2 revealed that there exists a positive significant 
correlation between tax administration and transfer- pricing regulation, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.273(p=0.003), which implies that the strength of the 
relationship between the duo is about 27.3% even though the relationship is weak. 
Also, there exists insignificant relationship of 7.5% (p=0.432) between tax 
administration and transfer- pricing compliance in the country, this weak relationship 
can be accounted for as a result of poor implementation of transfer- pricing related 
laws in the Nigeria tax system, even though as accounted by Ovunda (2015), the 
Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) had attempted to combat perceived income 
shifting by foreign taxpayers out of Nigeria, with the publication of new transfer- 
pricing rules as far back as September 21, 2012 and series of back- up in the anti-
avoidance provisions embedded in various tax laws particularly in Section 22 of the 
Companies Income Tax Act (CITA) Cap C21, LFN 2004, as amended by the CIT 
(Amendment) Act of 2007, section 15 of Petroleum Profit Tax Act and section 17 of 
Personal Income Tax Act (PITA). The relationship between the performance of tax 
administration, transfer- pricing regulation and compliance is still poor based on the 
correlation result. The results indicated a tandem with the a priori expectation that 
transfer- pricing regulation and its compliance have a positive correlation with tax 
administration in Nigeria. 
Table 3. Ordered Logit Regression Analysis 
Ordered Logit, using observations 1-113 
Dependent variable: TAXAD 
Standard errors based on Hessian 
 Coefficient Std. Error Z p-value  
TPR 0.323182 0.111708 2.8931 0.00381 *** 
TPC 0.0160475 0.120201 0.1335 0.89379  
cut1 6.52616 3.4329 1.9011 0.05729 * 
cut2 9.3394 3.49424 2.6728 0.00752 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  4.300885  S.D. dependent var  0.639265 
Log-likelihood -101.3292  Akaike criterion  210.6584 
Schwarz criterion  221.5680  Hannan-Quinn  215.0854 
Number of cases “correctly predicted” = 58 (51.3%) 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square(2) = 25.7916 [0.0000] 
Based on table II above, below is the ordered logit regression equation 
^TAXAD = + 0.323*TPR + 0.0160*TPC + 6.53*cut1 + 9.34*cut2 
(0.112) (0.120) (3.43) (3.49) 
T = 113, loglikelihood = -101 
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(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Form the results in table 3, the Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square(2)= 25.7916 
[0.0000] indicate that the overall model is significant at 5% level, which implies that 
the variables (transfer Pricing Regulation-TPR and Transfer Pricing Compliance-
TPC) identified are significant in explaining the variation in Tax Administration-
TAXAD in Nigeria. It is evident in cut1 and cut2 which are both significant. The 
result revealed based on the z-values that transfer- pricing regulations have a 
tendency to significantly influence tax administration in Nigeria, since their 
calculated z-values of 2.8931 (p=0.00381) is greater than the critical z-value of at 
5% level of significance, which implies that an increase in the scope of transfer- 
pricing regulation will result to 32.31%. This is in tandem with the conclusion of 
Ahmed (2014) that the enactment of Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulations 
2014 will help avoid mispricing and potential loss of tax revenue which occasioned 
transfer- pricing practices in multinational companies. Transfer- pricing compliance 
showed an insignificant effect of 0.016 on tax administration in the country with z-
values of 0.1335 (p=0.89379), this poor effect can be accounted for as a result of 
lack of administrative infrastructure and structure, corruption in the tax system, lack 
of training for FIRS staffers’, friction between the FIRS and the Multinational 
Companies (MNCs). Ovunda (2015) and Ahmed (2014) indicated that the poor 
compliance nature of multinational companies to transfer- pricing regulation are as 
a result of lack of knowledge on its laws by MNCs and requisite skill on transfer- 
pricing, customs-related challenges such as customs valuation, managing indirect 
charges in a transfer- pricing environment, transfer- pricing and tax residency risks, 
the application of transfer- pricing in a joint venture environment, poor database and 
difficulty in identifying transactions that are subject to the arm’s length rule and its 
application. The above result is also in tandem with the a priori expectation that 
transfer- pricing regulation and its compliance positively impact tax administration 
in Nigeria.  
Diagnostics Tests 
The following diagnostic test; variance inflation factor (VIF) and White 
Heteroskedasticity test were conducted in other to ensure reliability and validity of 
the above results. The results of the diagnostic test were thus presented below: 
Table 4. Variance Inflation Factor Test 
Coefficients 
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 
TPR .926 1.080 
OTRE .926 1.080 
Based on the results in table 4, all the variables (Transfer Pricing Regulation-TPR 
and Transfer Pricing Compliance-TPC) are relevant to the explanation of tax 
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administration with respect to transfer- pricing, since the VIF factors are all below 
the benchmark of 10, this is in accordance with the earlier result in table 3 which is 
the Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square(2)= 25.7916 [0.0000] indicating that the overall 
model is significant at 5% level. With this assertion, it is confirmed that there is 
absence of multicollinearity in the model. 
Table 5. Heteroskedasticity Test 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White 
F-statistic 1.738276 
Unadjusted R-squared 0.015383 
P(Chi-square(5) >1.738276) 0.884043 
Table 5 shows that the F-statistic and Unadjusted R-squared values of 1.738276 and 
0.015383 with p-value of 0.884043 respectively indicate the presence of no 
heteroskedasticity in the model since the F-statistic and Unadjusted R-squared have 
a p-value greater than the critical values at 5% level of significance. Thus, it is 
concluded that there is no heteroskedasticity in the model 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Based on the findings of the study, it is concluded that there is poor administration 
of transfer- pricing tax policy in Nigeria, and in addition, transfer- pricing and its 
compliance has the capacity to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of tax 
administration in Nigeria. It is therefore, recommended that FIRS should put in place 
not only transfer- pricing laws but adequate machinery in terms of human and 
technological capital coupled with sensitization on the applicability of the existing 
transfer- pricing tax policy in Nigeria. 
 
6. Limitations of the Study and Further Areas of Research 
This study is limited by the inability to directly quantify transfer- pricing in an 
attempt to track its influence of tax administration in Nigeria. Moreso, the study 
could not cover a wide range of audience for the qualitative response measures 
adopted in the study, though these limitations does not by any means erode the 
authenticity of discoveries made in the study. This study however suggest that further 
investigation on transfer- pricing should cover a wider scope, employing quantitative 
measures that can better represent the subject matter in the discourse of tax 
administration in Nigeria.  
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